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Abstract
In 1832, President Andrew Jackson issued a veto message claiming the same duty as the
Supreme Court to interpret the U.S. Constitution. Do modern presidents exercise the principal
role in interpreting the U.S. Constitution that President Jackson claimed was their duty, and, if
so, in what ways do they choose to articulate their interpretations? The hypothesis is that modern
presidents have exercised a principal role in interpreting the U.S. Constitution similar to the
interpretative duty expressed by President Jackson, and they perform this duty, in part, through
the issuance of veto messages and signing statements. After a content analysis of veto messages
and signing statements issued from Presidents Roosevelt to Trump, the hypothesis was
supported. Modern presidents have used veto messages and signing statements to articulate their
constitutional interpretations of numerous constitutional topics – a practice that has been
increasing throughout the modern presidency overall. Modern presidents have exercised a
principal role in interpreting the Constitution similar to that expressed by President Jackson.
Introduction
It is all but accepted that the Supreme Court is the final arbiter on the interpretation of the
Constitution of the United States. As a result, the roles of the other two branches of government
in interpreting the Constitution have been sidelined. As commander in chief, vested with the
executive power of the United States and the power to approve or veto legislation passed by the
Congress, the president may exert more of a role in interpreting the Constitution than previously
thought. The topic of this research is the role of the president of the United States in interpreting
the U.S. Constitution. As required by Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution, the president of
the United States takes an oath to “…preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United
States.” The argument can certainly be made, as was supported by President Andrew Jackson in
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1832, that this oath requires the president to uphold the Constitution as he understands it and not
as it is understood by others. If so, this would conceivably require the modern president to
assume an interpretative duty to some degree.
This research seeks to answer the following question: Do modern presidents exercise the
principal role in interpreting the U.S. Constitution that President Jackson claimed was their
duty, and, if so, in what ways do they choose to articulate their interpretations? Answering this
question requires extensive content analysis of documents issued by each modern president from
Franklin D. Roosevelt to Donald Trump, namely veto messages and signing statements, as will
be hypothesized. The goal is to determine whether modern presidents believe they have an
independent role in interpreting the Constitution. This process will lead to a conclusion about
whether the presidents of the modern era are guided by their own interpretations of the
Constitution or whether they have abandoned this interpretative duty and deferred to others’
opinions on the meaning of the Constitution.
Background
The president of the United States has a unique role in the American political system, as
the only constitutional officer with power over an entire branch of government. Article II,
Section 1 of the Constitution states that “The executive Power shall be vested in a President of
the United States of America.” As commander in chief, vested with the “…Power, by and with
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties…” under Article II, Section 2 and the
authority to “…receive Ambassadors and other public ministers” under Article II, Section 3 of
the Constitution, the president is seen as having principal foreign policy power. In addition to the
pardon power, appointment and removal power, recommendation power, and faithful execution
responsibility, among others, these broad and specific constitutional powers would conceivably
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require the chief executive to interpret the Constitution to determine their scope and exercise
them appropriately. Henry L. Chambers, Jr. (2016) asserts that, because of the presidential oath
of office and the Take Care Clause, “The Constitution requires the President to interpret the
Constitution and may allow him to act based on that interpretation” (1189). However, as David
A. Strauss (1993) argues, the appropriate scope of executive independence in interpreting the
Constitution is not easy to determine (116).
Many scholars have attempted to settle the boundaries of presidential constitutional
interpretation. Michael Stokes Paulsen (2017) claims that “The President of the United States
exercises his independent power and duty of faithful, responsible constitutional interpretation in
many ways.” Through his power to veto legislation, grant pardons, and faithfully execute the
laws, the president is in a position to “…interpret the Constitution independently of the views of
both Congress and the courts,” and, therefore, “…he can check what he concludes in good faith
are the unconstitutional or unlawful actions of these other branches” (Paulsen 2017). Some
scholars, including Harold H. Bruff (2016), have even claimed that “The most important single
interpreter of the United States Constitution is the president,” which is supported by the fact that
“Presidential constitutional interpretation is fundamentally unlike that of the other two branches
because it is ultimately performed by a single person, not a group” (8 and 10, respectively).
Similarly, Dawn E. Johnsen (2008) notes that “The President’s constitutionally prescribed oath
of office, the Take Care Clause, and the Supremacy Clause confirm the President’s obligation to
uphold the Constitution through all executive action” (408). However, there are many contested
constitutional issues where the three branches of government disagree as to the proper
interpretation, such as the extent of authority vested in the president as commander in chief
(Johnsen 2008, 408). In determining which branch’s constitutional interpretation should prevail
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in these cases, Johnsen (2008) argues that “The answer must acknowledge that a measure of
independence in presidential interpretation is unavoidable” (408). This is especially true given
that presidents must constantly address issues that require constitutional interpretation but lack
sufficient judicial guidance and precedent, such as “…issues of national security and the
separation of powers” (Johnsen 2008, 408). Whether this is because the Supreme Court has
acknowledged the interpretive value of giving wide deference to the executive branch or because
presidents have had to act on certain issues before the Congress, it is altogether both impossible
and impractical to command presidents to merely enforce judicial precedent and never
implement their own constitutional interpretations (Johnsen 2008, 408). As a result, Johnsen
(2008) claims that presidents have historically been important contributors to the overall
interpretation of the Constitution, and, therefore, the question that needs to be asked is not
whether but how presidents should play a role in deciding constitutional meaning (409).
In the early United States, the president’s power to veto legislation was one way in which
he interpreted the Constitution. This veto power, as Alexander Hamilton (1788) claims in The
Federalist No. 73, “…not only serves as a shield to the executive, but it furnishes an additional
security against the enaction of improper laws.” The practice at the time was for presidents to
only veto legislation they believed was unconstitutional. According to Richard A. Watson
(1987), “When early Presidents did veto legislation, they tended to emphasize constitutional
objections” in their veto messages (408). A veto message is a statement issued by the president
upon refusing to sign a bill into law. One notable explanation of the president’s role in
interpreting the Constitution was given by President Andrew Jackson in 1832 when he vetoed a
bill to reauthorize the Bank of the United States. Jackson (1832) issued a veto message claiming
the same duty as the Congress and the Supreme Court to interpret the Constitution, arguing that
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“The Congress, the Executive, and the Court must each for itself be guided by its own opinion of
the Constitution” and that “Each public officer who takes an oath to support the Constitution
swears that he will support it as he understands it, and not as it is understood by others.” He
asserted that “It is as much the duty…of the President to decide upon the constitutionality of any
bill or resolution which may be presented to them for passage or approval as it is of the supreme
judges when it may be brought before them for judicial decision” (Jackson 1832). Using veto
messages to articulate constitutional interpretations was not limited to Jackson. Bruce G.
Peabody (2001) writes that “In nineteenth century veto messages, for example, presidents used
the full array of interpretive modalities associated with judicial analysis…” (60). However, as
Carl McGowan (1986) argues, there is nothing in the Constitution limiting the veto power to
unconstitutional bills (805).
In cases when the veto is an inadequate solution and the president believes, based on his
reading of the Take Care Clause, that he must decline to carry out an unconstitutional part of a
law, a signing statement is the way through which he can declare that intention (Chambers, Jr.
2016, 1200). A signing statement is a written pronouncement issued by the president upon
signing a bill into law, explaining his reasoning for signing, his interpretation of the law’s
meaning, his objections to certain aspects of the law, and/or how he intends to carry out the law
(Library of Congress, n.d.). According to Kevin Evans and Bryan Marshall (2016), as effective
tools through which the president can give credit to members of the Congress for passing a law
and voice constitutional objections to certain provisions of a bill, “…signing statements provide
a rich history of interbranch relations…” (750 and 775, respectively). Todd Garvey (2012) notes
that there is an extensive history of presidents issuing signing statements, and the executive
branch has historically held that the president has authority to refuse to enforce provisions of a
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law he believes are unconstitutional (14 and 15, respectively). “Concurrent with the rise in the
number of statements issued, the use of signing statements to voice constitutional objections to
acts of Congress has become increasingly prevalent over the past 60 years,” even while there is
seemingly little support for granting legal effect to objections raised in such statements (Garvey
2012, 2 and 14, respectively). These types of signing statements are controversial because the
Constitution does not establish the extent of presidential discretion to decline to enforce
unconstitutional legislation (Chambers, Jr. 2016, 1186). Additionally, “…the use of
constitutional signing statements can augment executive power and functionally alter the
Constitution’s separation of powers structure” (Chambers, Jr. 2016, 1187). These constitutional
signing statements are proper insofar as the president’s constitutional interpretation is not bound
by the dueling interpretations of the Congress or the Supreme Court (Chambers, Jr. 2016, 1201).
The Supreme Court is seen as the final arbiter on the meaning of the Constitution, while
the presidency has become more of an administrative and policy-focused office. According to
Peabody (2001), “In the eyes of the majority of political actors…, the Court’s exclusive or at
least final authority to interpret the Constitution seems to be well-settled…” (57). That does not
mean modern presidents have given up their role in interpreting the Constitution. “Though the
Court has the final word regarding the Constitution’s meaning,” Chambers, Jr. (2016) notes, “the
President may be obligated to interpret the Constitution” (1185). Some legal scholars note that
“There is nothing in our constitutional text that prohibits an institutional sharing of the
‘interpretative power,’ and there is much in our polity’s structure and history to suggest that its
successful operation demands this division” (Peabody 2001, 57). Similarly, Paulsen (2017)
writes that “The power of constitutional interpretation is not exclusively vested in the judiciary”
but rather “…is possessed by each branch as a consequence of its other constitutional powers and
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its oath of fidelity to the Constitution.” The separation of powers allows for each branch of
government not to be bound by the others’ interpretations (Paulsen 2017). Furthermore,
according to Geoffrey P. Miller (1993), “The history of checks and balances is also inconsistent
with the notion of judicial supremacy in interpretation” (40). As such, “The Constitution itself
does not subordinate the president to the courts in matters of constitutional interpretation” and
“…there is nothing in [the judicial branch’s] function that is inconsistent with an autonomous
presidential power of constitutional interpretation” (Miller 1993, 40). This argument is
seemingly supported by the Framers of the Constitution. James Madison (1788) maintains in The
Federalist No. 49 that “The several departments being perfectly co-ordinate by the terms of their
common commission, neither of them, it is evident, can pretend to an exclusive or superior right
of settling the boundaries between their respective powers.” This sets the foundation for the
inquiry, namely whether modern presidents have assumed this independent interpretative role.
Hypothesis
The president’s role in interpreting the Constitution, the scope and independence of that
role, and the modes through which the president articulates his interpretation, have all been
extensively considered, researched, and debated by many scholars. The following is an attempt
to contribute to this research and to provide a new lens through which to view the modern
presidency in relation to this topic. As a reminder, the research question is the following: Do
modern presidents exercise the principal role in interpreting the U.S. Constitution that President
Jackson claimed was their duty, and, if so, in what ways do they choose to articulate their
interpretations? The hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis: Modern presidents have exercised a principal role in
interpreting the U.S. Constitution similar to the interpretative duty
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expressed by President Jackson, and they perform this duty, in
part, through the issuance of veto messages and signing statements.
The null hypothesis is that modern presidents have not exercised a principal role in interpreting
the U.S. Constitution similar to the interpretative duty expressed by President Jackson, and/or
they do not perform this duty, in part, through the issuance of veto messages and signing
statements. The hypothesis will be supported if modern presidents demonstrate a propensity to
use veto messages and signing statements as modes through which to voice their interpretations.
Methodology
It is necessary to first define “modern presidents.” For the purposes of this research, the
modern presidency is the period in presidential history encompassing President Franklin D.
Roosevelt to the present day. These 14 presidents, not including President Biden (lack of
content), are the focus of this research. To answer the research question, it is necessary to
conduct a content analysis of presidential veto messages and signing statements issued from
President Roosevelt to President Trump and document those that mention the Constitution or a
constitutional provision explicitly or implicitly. This amounts to a total of 679 veto messages and
2,128 signing statements. The veto messages collected represent both regular vetoes, when the
president returns legislation without his approval to the original house, and pocket vetoes, when
legislation passed by the Congress does not become law because the president withholds his
signature and the Congress adjourns within the 10-day period the president has to act on the bill.
The veto messages are primarily accessed through the United States Senate’s website (United
States Senate), and the signing statements (as well as a handful of veto messages) are accessed
through The American Presidency Project’s document archive (The American Presidency
Project). Access to content is particularly limited for Presidents Roosevelt and Truman.
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To determine what constitutional provisions are cited most frequently, those mentioned in
each document are marked accordingly. These citations are grouped into 17 categories, each one
representing a part of the Constitution: Constitutionality/Unconstitutionality/Constitutional
Concerns, Congressional Power, Incompatibility and Ineligibility Clauses, Presentment
Clause/Veto Power, Vesting Clause/Executive Power/Constitutional Authority, Commander in
Chief Clause, Foreign Policy Power/Treaty-Making Power, Appointments Clause/Appointment
Power/Removal Power, Recommendations Clause, Take Care Clause, Bill of Rights, Fourteenth
Amendment, Discharge of Duties/Constitutional Responsibilities, Separation of Powers/Checks
and Balances, Federalism, INS v. Chadha (1983), and Miscellaneous. The goal is to determine
whether modern presidents not only have a role in interpreting the Constitution but acknowledge
that role and act upon it as their duty.
Findings
Figure 1.
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Figure 2.
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The line graphs above detail the first set of findings. Figure 1 shows the number of veto
messages issued by each president from Roosevelt to Trump that, in some way, mention the
Constitution, while Figure 2 shows the number of signing statements issued by each president
that mention the Constitution. As can be seen, these modern presidents (obviously some more
than others) have articulated some sort of constitutional interpretation both when signing and
returning legislation. All but one modern president issued at least one veto message mentioning
the Constitution, while all 14 issued at least one signing statement with a constitutional
interpretation. The number of veto messages mentioning the Constitution reaches its highest
points with Reagan (26), Bush (18), and Clinton (14), while the number of signing statements
rises steadily from Ford to Bush and remains consistently high from Clinton to Trump, with
Obama as the exception with only 23. Six presidents issued at least 10 veto messages mentioning
the Constitution, and 11 presidents issued at least 10 signing statements mentioning the
Constitution, with eight issuing at least 20, six issuing at least 40, and four issuing at least 90
statements. In total, 18.3% of all veto messages issued from Roosevelt to Trump mention the
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Constitution, and 31.7% of all signing statements issued from these presidents mention the
Constitution. These figures are inherently affected by the number of bills each president is
presented with. Since this is beyond their control, it is necessary to look at percentages over time.
Figure 3.
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Figure 4.
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Figure 3 shows the percentage of veto messages issued by each president from Roosevelt
to Trump that mention the Constitution in some form, while Figure 4 shows the percentage of
signing statements issued by each president that mention the Constitution. These percentages
were calculated by dividing the sums shown in Figures 1 and 2 for each president by the
corresponding total number of veto messages or signing statements examined from each
president, thereby putting them on an equal footing with each other regardless of how many bills
they were presented with. These numbers in Figures 3 and 4 demonstrate what percent of the
total veto messages and signing statements examined for each president included a constitutional
interpretation. The percentage of veto messages mentioning the Constitution reaches consistently
high values from Carter to Trump, with Obama as the exception, while the percentage of signing
statements mentioning the Constitution reaches consistently high values from Ford to Trump.
Eleven presidents mention the Constitution in at least 10% of their veto messages, with eight
mentioning it in at least 15% and six mentioning it in at least 29% of their messages.
Additionally, 10 presidents mention the Constitution in at least 10% of their signing statements,
with eight mentioning it in at least 18%, six mentioning it in at least 25%, and four mentioning it
in at least 50% of their statements. As shown by the trendlines, albeit with some exceptions, the
percentages have been noticeably increasing throughout the modern presidency for both veto
messages and signing statements.
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Figure 5.
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The findings shown in Figures 1-4 seemingly support the hypothesis, namely that modern
presidents – especially those from Ford to Trump – acknowledge that they have a role in
interpreting the Constitution when it comes to signing and vetoing legislation. When interpreting
the Constitution, what parts of the document do these presidents cite? Figure 5 shows the 17
constitutional categories that encapsulate the types of constitutional provisions cited by modern
presidents in all their veto messages and signing statements combined. The most frequently cited
provision that modern presidents interpret – mentioned 741 times from Roosevelt to Trump – is
the category that includes the Vesting Clause of Article II – “The executive Power shall be
vested in a President of the United States of America” – the extent of executive power, and the
president’s constitutional authority. The second most frequently mentioned category (526 times)
is a president’s basic expression of a legislative provision’s constitutionality, unconstitutionality,
or constitutional concern. An example from this category is President Truman’s (1950) assertion
in his veto of H.R. 9490, the Internal Security Act of 1950, that “A phrase so vague raises a
serious constitutional question.” Other frequently mentioned categories include principles of
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separation of powers and checks and balances (403 times); the president’s foreign policy power
(391 times); and the Appointments Clause of Article II, Section 2, including the president’s
power of appointment and power of removal (266 times).
Analysis
Based on the findings above, modern presidents have clearly used veto messages and
signing statements to some degree to articulate their constitutional interpretations. Although less
than half of all veto messages (18.3%) and signing statements (31.7%) mention the Constitution,
these percentages still represent a decent portion of the total issued from Roosevelt to Trump.
These percentages – 18.3% and 31.7% – represent 124 veto messages and 674 signing
statements, respectively, that include constitutional interpretations. These sums demonstrate that
modern presidents take the opportunity to mention and interpret the Constitution when the right
legislation presents itself to warrant their interpretations. It is important to note that a significant
number of veto messages (and some signing statements) were issued in response to legislation
passed by the Congress providing relief for particular individuals and organizations titled “For
the relief of….” These types of bills predictably did not contain the content that elicits a
constitutional interpretation on the part of the president. Understandably, a president will not be
compelled to issue a constitutional interpretation for every bill that he is presented with,
especially where the contents of those bills do not warrant it. However, for those that do – in this
case, for the 798 bills, or 28.4% of bills, presented to a total of 14 presidents – the modern
president will take the opportunity to articulate his constitutional interpretation where
appropriate. Not only that, but the percentages of veto messages and signing statements
mentioning the Constitution per president from Roosevelt to Trump have actually been
increasing overall. The average percentage of veto messages mentioning the Constitution per
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president from Roosevelt to Ford is 12.1%, which increases to an average of 31.6% per president
from Carter to Trump. Likewise, the average percentage of signing statements mentioning the
Constitution per president from Roosevelt to Nixon is 7.2%, which rises to an average of 49%
per president from Ford to Trump. These increases reveal the modern president’s growing
tendency to use these pronouncements as ways through which to interpret the Constitution.
In light of these findings, why is this important? First, it clearly indicates that modern
presidents perceive themselves as independent interpreters of the Constitution. In many respects,
they are guided by their own constitutional interpretations, especially of those provisions of the
Constitution that define the powers and duties of the president. The evidence clearly supports
this observation; 53% of all mentions of the Constitution are related to Article II, which sets out
the executive branch of government and includes the following categories: Vesting
Clause/Executive Power/Constitutional Authority, Commander in Chief Clause, Foreign Policy
Power/Treaty-Making Power, Appointments Clause/Appointment Power/Removal Power,
Recommendations Clause, and Take Care Clause. President Trump (2018) issued a signing
statement expressing his administration’s intention to carry out a provision of S. 756, the First
Step Act of 2018, “…in a manner consistent with Article II, section 3 of the Constitution, which
provides the President the discretion to recommend to the Congress only ‘such Measures as he
shall judge necessary and expedient.’” Interpreting the president’s foreign policy power under
Article II, President Obama (2013) noted in a signing statement that certain provisions of H.R.
4310, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, “…could interfere with my
constitutional authority to conduct the foreign relations of the United States.” These are just two
of the many examples of the president exercising his interpretative duty over Article II.
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Additionally, just over one out of every five mentions of the Constitution – 21.7% – are,
to some extent, interpretations of executive power. These interpretations range from direct
citations of the Vesting Clause of Article II to indirect references of the president’s constitutional
authority. For example, President Reagan (1988) pocket vetoed S. 508, the Whistleblower
Protection Act of 1988, citing that “The litigation of intra-Executive branch disputes conflicts
with the constitutional grant of the Executive power to the President…” (2578). President
Clinton (1999) gave a more indirect reference when he signed H.R. 2490, the Treasury and
General Government Appropriations Act, 2000, noting that a particular provision of the act
would not be interpreted “…to detract from my constitutional authority and that of my appointed
heads of departments to supervise and control the operations and communications of the
executive branch….” This demonstrates that modern presidents have taken the lead, as opposed
to the other two branches of government, in interpreting those parts of the Constitution that affect
them the most, namely Article II and the extent of executive power. Just as the Congress and the
courts have discretion over the extent of the constitutional powers and operations of their
respective branches, the modern president has shown his desire to exercise his rightful discretion
over the scope of the constitutional powers and operations of his branch of government.
Beyond Article II, modern presidents have also articulated their own interpretations of a
wide range of constitutional topics, such as the extent of congressional power, the separation of
powers, the Bill of Rights, and more. For example, President Johnson (1965) vetoed H.R. 8439,
the FY1966 Military Construction Authorization Bill, because “Its enactment would represent a
fundamental encroachment on one of the great principles of the American Constitutional system
– the separation of powers between the Legislative and Executive branches.” When President
George H. W. Bush (1992) vetoed S. 3, the Congressional Campaign Spending Limit and
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Election Reform Act of 1992, he determined that “…S. 3 would limit political speech protected
by the First Amendment…” (1). Furthermore, there are many instances – such as the 86 times
these presidents cite the Supreme Court’s decision in INS v. Chadha (1983) – in which these
presidents reference a Supreme Court ruling to support their own interpretations of the
Presentment Clause and the separation of powers doctrine. INS v. Chadha (1983) is a case in
which the Court found the Immigration and Nationality Act’s provision for a one-House
legislative veto of executive actions to be unconstitutional because it violated the separation of
powers (Oyez, n.d.). President George H. W. Bush (1990) pocket vetoed S. 2834, the
Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1991, because he found language conditioning the
president’s actions on his obtaining the approval of a congressional committee to be “…clearly
unconstitutional under the Presentment clause of the Constitution and the Supreme Court’s
decision in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)” (118). When signing H.R. 2217, the
Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2002, President George W.
Bush (2001) acknowledged that “Several provisions in the bill purport to require congressional
approval before executive branch execution of aspects of the bill” – an inherent separation of
powers issue – and, therefore, he stated his intention to “…interpret such provisions to require
notification only, since any other interpretation would contradict the Supreme Court ruling in
INS v. Chadha.” These two examples demonstrate how constitutional interpretations can include
multiple constitutional provisions coupled with one another and/or linked to Supreme Court
decisions.
It is not clear, however, whether these examples show a willingness on the part of the
president to respect judicial supremacy, especially considering many modern presidents viewed
legislative veto devices as unconstitutional before the 1983 Chadha decision. For example, when
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he signed S. 2391, the Futures Trading Act of 1978, President Carter (1978) objected to a
provision requiring congressional committee approval before action by a commission because
“This ‘committee approval’ requirement is one of several types of legislative veto devices which
I and the Attorney General view as unconstitutional….” While not necessarily the final arbiter on
its meaning, the modern president is clearly a central figure in the overall interpretation of the
Constitution and exercises a relatively independent interpretative duty. In this way, the
hypothesis is supported: Modern presidents have exercised a principal role in interpreting the
Constitution similar to the interpretative duty expressed by President Jackson, and they have
shown a tendency to use their veto messages and signing statements to perform this duty.
Conclusion
When thinking about the powers and responsibilities of the president of the United States,
interpreting the Constitution is not likely to be an obvious one. This research considered the
modern president’s role in interpreting the U.S. Constitution, asking whether they have exercised
a principal role and, if so, how they have performed it. President Jackson once claimed that the
president has an equal right to interpret the Constitution as the Congress and the Supreme Court.
There are many scholars who support this position, arguing that the separation of powers allows
for the sharing of interpretive power across the three branches of government, that the president
has the ability to independently interpret the Constitution as he understands it, and that the
president is an important contributor to the overall interpretation of the Constitution. The
hypothesis was that modern presidents have exercised a principal role in interpreting the U.S.
Constitution similar to the interpretative duty expressed by President Jackson, and they perform
this duty, in part, through the issuance of veto messages and signing statements.
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After extensive content analysis of 2,807 veto messages and signing statements issued
from Presidents Roosevelt to Trump, this hypothesis was supported. Given that 18.3% of all veto
messages and 31.7% of all signing statements issued during the modern presidency mentioned
the Constitution in some form, it is evident that modern presidents have a principal role in
interpreting the Constitution, are aware of this role, and are willing to exercise this role
independently as their duty. Modern presidents have used these pronouncements as mechanisms
through which to articulate their constitutional interpretations, and this practice has been
noticeably increasing throughout the modern presidency. Moreover, modern presidents are, in
part, guided by their own constitutional interpretations, especially of those constitutional
provisions that are the most relevant to their office. President Jackson would be proud.
Of course, there is more research to be done with this topic. First, one could examine the
differences between Democratic and Republican presidents in both the frequency and content of
their constitutional interpretations. Second, further research could explore the other ways through
which the president exercises his role in interpreting the Constitution, considering the president
is not presented with a bill every day. Third and finally, given that the modern presidency has
steadily grown into a policy-focused office, it is possible that modern presidents have used the
Constitution in their veto messages and signing statements as a rationale for defending their own
policy interests; one might assume that these presidents are more interested in using the
Constitution as a cover for the ulterior motive of protecting their policy preferences. Those
interested might further analyze these veto messages and signing statements in order to discern
whether modern presidents tend to use the Constitution strategically in this way.
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